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The Obama Administration’s
Clean Air Act Legacy and the
UNFCCC
Uma Outka
In the face of a gridlock Congress, hopes for comprehensive
climate legislation were dashed early in President Obama’s first
term. U.S. leadership in international climate policy had been
seriously undermined in ways, he soon learned, were not easily
repaired. The President’s engagement with climate issues, to
many observers, seemed slow and inconsistent, but deepened
rhetorically and substantively in the second term with a decisive
focus on existing statutory authority, looking most importantly
to the Clean Air Act as a vehicle for greenhouse gas regulation.
This essay situates the Obama Administration’s Clean Air Act
regulatory agenda in the context of longstanding domestic
obligations of signatories to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change as well as positioning for the
2015 Conference of the Parties in Paris.
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In the early days of the Obama Administration, comprehensive
climate change legislation was taking shape on the horizon. Years of
inaction on greenhouse gas emissions by the United States was, many
hoped, nearing an end. Yet the new President Obama soon found
himself facing a Congress quick to oppose his initiatives across a
spectrum of issues, and climate change seemed to take a back seat to
other important concerns. In the second term, however, the
Administration renewed its focus on climate change. In June of 2013,
the President announced a new Climate Action Plan at Georgetown
University – “a plan to cut carbon pollution; a plan to protect our
country from the impacts of climate change; and a plan to lead the
Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. A special
thanks is due to Juscelino Colares for organizing a climate-focused panel
for this Symposium, and to Jason Vigil and Nicholas Birdsong, who
provided research assistance.
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world in a coordinated assault on a changing climate.”1 As the
“world’s largest economy and second largest carbon emitter,” the
President acknowledged, the U.S. has “a unique responsibility.”2
A single statute—the Clean Air Act—provides critical executive
authority for advancing the President’s climate change goals. The
Clean Air Act of 1970 was the first comprehensive federal
environmental regulatory program.3 Today, it remains the primary
federal environmental law that controls air pollution from mobile
sources, like cars and trucks, and from stationary sources, like
factories, refineries, and power plants.
The pressure of growing climate concerns worldwide, and
continued congressional gridlock at home, escalated the importance of
the Clean Air Act’s potential for controlling greenhouse gas emissions.
Under the Obama Administration, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) proposed a suite of regulations that implement the
Clean Air Act for this purpose.4 As this essay will explain, these
regulations are significant in both domestic and international
registers. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the United States and nearly every other nation in
the world has declared a common goal and shared commitment to
averting catastrophic climate change. The complicated history of the
U.S. role in this treaty and its implementation forms an important
backdrop to the Administration’s second-term approach to domestic
climate action. This approach has been multi-faceted, combining
regulatory action by federal agencies with executive orders and
bilateral talks, but it is the Clean Air Act—my focus here—that
hinges the domestic and international aspects of the Administration’s
climate mitigation strategy. Understanding the Clean Air Act’s role is
especially important now that all eyes are on the U.S. and other
major emitting countries to achieve the goals outlined in a new
international agreement penned at the close of 2015 in Paris, France
1.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change
(June 25, 2013, 1:45 PM) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarkspresident-climate-change [https://perma.cc/5879-JQ48]).

2.

Id. Although the U.S. is currently the second largest annual carbon
emitter, behind China, the US is still the largest historical emitter in the
world. See generally, NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, GLOBAL CARBON
ATLAS, available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report
[http://perma.cc/Q5XN-XJQB] (summarizing the impact of climate
change of the United States).

3.

Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).

4.

EPA Greenhouse Gas Regulation FAQ, CTR. CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, available at
http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/greenhouse-gas-regulationfaq [http://perma.cc/DBM9-T589].

110

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
The Obama Administration’s Clean Air Act Legacy and the UNFCCC

by the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the Framework
Convention.5
In what follows, this essay situates the Administration’s ambitious
Clean Air Act regulatory agenda in the context of domestic
obligations of signatories to the Framework Convention and in
relation to positioning for COP21. The essay closes with some early
perspectives on the Administration’s legacy for the Clean Air Act and
climate change policy.

I. The UNFCC, Domestic Obligations, and the Early
Obama Administration
The U.S. was among the first nations to sign the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992,
marking a landmark international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to mitigate global climate change.6 For every U.S.
president following President George H.W. Bush, who signed the
Convention, the UNFCC has provided the formal structure for
international dialogue and policy negotiations on climate change.
The UNFCCC reflects the common recognition “that change in
the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of
humankind.”7 Parties to the Convention agreed in broad terms to the
objective of achieving “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”8 As a signatory,
the U.S. committed to “adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”9

5.

See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Draft decision-Annex /CP.21,
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BHH5-6WNM].

6.

The UNFCCC is a near-universal treaty with 195 Parties. See Status of
Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION CLIMATE CHANGE, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratificati
on/items/2631.php [http://perma.cc/22MB-KGLP] (listing the latest
information concerning dates of signature and receipt of instruments of
ratification by the Secretary-General of the United Nations).

7.

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., opened for
signature May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[hereinafter UNFCCC].

8.

Id. at art. 2.

9.

Id. at art. 4.2(a).
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Coordinating individual national commitments for effective
implementation remains extremely challenging. In the first major
instrument developed by the Parties for this purpose, the Kyoto
Protocol, binding emissions reductions applied only to developed
nations.10 Although climate stabilization ultimately will require
emissions reductions in fast-growing developing countries as well,
Kyoto’s contrasting obligations for developed and developing nations
sought to capture the UNFCCC’s central tenet of common but
differentiated responsibilities.11 The text of the treaty establishes this
as a foremost principle for agreement:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.12

The Kyoto Protocol’s structural emphasis on developed nations’
obligations became politically divisive in the U.S. Despite significant
involvement with the Protocol’s design under the Clinton
Administration, the U.S. ultimately declined to ratify it under
President George W. Bush, due to fears that the U.S. would suffer
economically if targets did not apply to polluting developing
countries, namely China and India.13 This was seen as a major setback
to the success of the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol eventually went
into effect after a struggle to secure sufficient signatories to account
for the U.S.’s absence, and as a result the U.S. leadership position in
climate change negotiations was seriously undercut.14 Throughout the
second Bush Administration, although the U.S. maintained its official
posture of commitment to the shared aims of the UNFCCC, the U.S.
was widely regarded as a blocking agent, no longer a facilitator, of
international climate progress.15

10.

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37
I.L.M. 22 (1998).

11.

See id. at arts. 10(c), 10(e), 11.2(a), 11.2(b).

12.

UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 3.1.

13.

See CINNAMON PINON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY:
EU AND US APPROACHES 35-36 (2010) (discussing the United States’
role in early years of the Kyoto Protocols).

14.

See id. at 8-9 (explaining the effects of the U.S not ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol, had on its leadership role on environmental issues).

15.

See id. at 36-37 (discussing the Bush Administration’s policy on climate
change).
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When Barack Obama was elected, a renewed commitment to
climate change mitigation was among his stated priorities.
Domestically, many thought that nationwide climate change
legislation would be imminently forthcoming in his first term after the
House of Representatives passed a comprehensive climate bill; but it
did not pass in the Senate.16 In 2009, on the international stage,
President Obama pledged the U.S. would cut GHG emissions by 17
percent below 2005 levels by the year 2020.17 Yet his first major
public foray into climate change negotiations, at the 2009 Conference
of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark, ended in frustration,
protests, and few notable successes.18 The Obama Administration’s
subsequent role internationally on climate issues, at least for the
remainder of his first term, had a lower profile.
Facing intense political opposition on a range of other priorities,
the congressional gridlock on domestic climate change policy did not
speak well for the Administration’s prospects with new international
commitments. The experience of the Clinton-Gore White House
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations was a cautionary tale.19 Seeing
no near-term potential for meaningful climate legislation, President
Obama turned his attention to the potential for climate progress
under existing statutory authority.20 Reflecting this reorientation
toward executive action, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has been the focal
point of the Obama Administration’s efforts to achieve climate change
mitigation goals, particularly in the second term.21
16.

See generally id. at 54-56 (describing the Obama administration’s
attempt to pass a bill addressing climate change).

17.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN 6 (JUNE 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclima
teactionplan.pdf [http://perma.cc/3HA6-WNCK]; see also UNFCCC,
Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to be
implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (June 7,
2011), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/sb/eng/inf01r01.pdf
[perma.cc/9VLL-7MLM] (providing a summary of the United States’
goals in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions).

18.

See generally Leslie G. Fields & Royce G. Brooks, President Obama and
the New Politics of Inclusion in the Climate Change Debate, 9 FLA. A &
M U. L. REV. 441, 449-451 (2014) (explaining the disappointment that
climate change advocates felt in regard to the 2009 Conference).

19.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal versus Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,
31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2007) (discussing the Clinton-Gore
White House’s ambivalent approach after the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations).

20.

Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications
for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 244 (2007).

21.

Justin Gillis, Obama Puts Legacy at Stake With Clean-Air Act, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2013),
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However, the origins of the CAA’s centrality to domestic climate
mitigation traces to before President Obama’s election to the 2007
landmark Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA.22 In that
case, the EPA under the second Bush Administration rejected
petitions to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. In
its 5-4 decision, however, the Court held that the EPA did have
statutory authority to regulate GHGs under § 202 of the CAA and
that the EPA’s avoidance of GHG regulation was arbitrary.23
According to the Court, the statute required the agency to justify its
position, if it could, with a reasoned Endangerment Finding—
essentially, a determination of whether GHGs endanger public health
and welfare.24
The authority recognized by the case provided the foundation for
the Obama Administration’s substantive CAA regulatory agenda
pertaining to GHGs. It was President Obama’s new EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson who issued the affirmative Endangerment
Finding for GHGs from mobile sources.25 The Administration followed
this Finding, as the CAA requires, with new regulations of vehicle
emissions and fuel economy standards; but soon after, its regulatory
focus expanded to include an even more significant source of GHGs
within the energy sector: electric power plants.

II. The Clean Air Act, Obama’s Climate Change
Legacy, and COP21
The only U.S. economic sector that emits more GHGs than
transportation is the electric power industry, at thirty-one percent of
total emissions (contrasted with twenty-seven percent for
transportation by most recent data).26 The CAA addresses both
sectors, under separate titles, and the post-Mass. v. EPA rule for
vehicle emissions—the so-called Tailpipe Rule—raised questions about
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-actreinterpreted-would-focus-on-flexibility-and-state-level-efforts.html?_r=1
[http://perma.cc/22Y9-BAZ9].
22.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-33 (2007) (holding that the
CAA could be applied to the regulation of greenhouse gases).

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg.
66496, 66537 (Dec. 15, 2009).

26.

EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 19902013, 24 (2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/USGHG-Inventory-2015-Main-Text.pdf [http://perma.cc/VYC5-Q56T].
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whether and how that regulation affected stationary sources of
GHGs.27
This became a point of controversy over statutory interpretation.
The EPA read the statute to require that once GHGs were “regulated
pollutants” under the mobile source sections of the Act, they must be
regulated under the stationary source permitting programs. In other
words, the agency saw the effective date of the Tailpipe Rule as a
trigger for stationary source regulation, affecting power plants and
more. The problem with this reading, by the EPA’s own admission,
was practical in nature; its literal effect was to significantly expand
the EPA’s regulatory reach to include many more stationary sources
than had been previously subject to Clean Air Act permitting
obligations.28 To preserve administrative feasibility in the stationary
source context, the EPA crafted a so-called Triggering Rule,
explaining the perceived trigger effect of mobile source regulation of
GHGs into the stationary source context,29 and a Tailoring Rule that
limited this expansion by tailoring GHG regulation of stationary
sources to the largest emitters.30
When this trio of related rules was challenged in court, the D.C.
Circuit upheld them all,31 but the Supreme Court delivered a mixed
opinion in 2014’s Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, rejecting the
Triggering and Tailoring Rules as impermissible statutory revision by
the agency, while also reinforcing the EPA’s authority to regulate
GHGs.32

27.

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324,
25401 (May 7, 2010).

28.

See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31601 (June 3, 2010)
[hereinafter Prevention of Significant Deterioration] (explaining that
some believe that EPA failed to take into effect the impact of its
decision).

29.

See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting; Final Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 17004, 17023 (Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining how Title V comes into
effect on a stationary source).

30.

Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 28, at 31516.

31.

See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102,
113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding the EPA acted in a proper manner in
regulating greenhouses gases through the CAA).

32.

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014). Six
petitions for certiorari were granted together to answer a single question
presented: “Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting
requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit
greenhouse gases.”
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From a climate perspective, several aspects of the opinion are
especially noteworthy. First, the Court chose not to revisit the
Endangerment Finding or the Tailpipe Rule, declining to reconsider
whether GHG regulation under § 202 was justified, thus letting that
key decision stand.33 Second, despite a forceful rebuke of EPA’s
reading of the statute, the Court’s interpretation allowed EPA to
proceed in regulating most large emitters.34 In rejecting the Trigger
Rule, the Court disallowed stationary source regulation based solely
on GHG emissions. Critically, nothing in the opinion precludes the
EPA from imposing limits on GHGs emitted from stationary sources
that are subject to permitting requirements anyway for other air
pollutants: in the Court’s shorthand, “anyway” sources.35 With
“anyway” sources accounting for over eighty percent of emitters
covered by the Tailoring Rule, this was largely a victory for CAA
regulation of GHGs, despite the opinion’s ring of bruising defeat.36
Critical subsequent developments have utilized additional sources
of regulatory authority under the CAA. Turning from the mobile
source provisions to the stationary source permitting provisions, the
EPA moved to regulate GHGs using § 111 New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS). In contrast to the permitting provisions, which
direct the EPA to apply a “best available control technology”
standard to high-emitting sources on a facility-specific, case-by-case
basis, § 111 sets national standards for categories of sources as a
minimum, uniform threshold of performance.37 Under § 111(b), the
EPA developed the first NSPS for carbon pollution from new power
plants38 and the first NSPS for methane, a potent GHG, from new
sources in the oil and gas industry.39 The rules will apply uniform
33.

Amanda C. Leiter, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: A Shot Across
the Bow of the Administrative State, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POLICY 59, 69-70 (2014).

34.

“We conclude that EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresholds was
impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s
interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power to
‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous
statutory terms.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445.

35.

Id. at 2447-48 (holding it permissible for the EPA to apply BACT
standards to “anyway” sources).

36.

Id. at 2438-39.

37.

Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510, 64527 (Oct. 23,
2015).

38.

Id. at 64512.

39.

Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 56593
(proposed Sept. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (prior
NSPS covered volatile organic compounds and sulfur dioxide emissions).
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national standards for control of these pollutants to any new sources
within these categories. The limitation of new source regulation of
this kind is that it does nothing to address the level of air pollution
from existing sources, which are responsible for energy’s status as the
highest emitting sector. To address this, the EPA developed an
ambitious rule under the less commonly used § 111(d) to set carbon
pollution guidelines for existing power plants.40 The new rule, known
as the Clean Power Plan, is controversial because it sets state-specific
goals for reducing carbon emissions in the power sector, using carbon
emission performance rates for existing “fossil-fuel fired electric
generating units.”41 The rule provides guidelines for implementation
by the states, but a federal implementation plan will go into effect in
states that fail to develop an approvable plan of their own.42 The EPA
projects that “[w]hen the Clean Power Plan is fully in place in 2030,
carbon pollution from the power sector will be 32 percent below 2005
levels, securing progress and making sure it continues.”43
This rulemaking is an essential component of the broader Climate
Action Plan the President announced in 2013.44 The Climate Action
Plan outlined three overarching goals: (1) to continue to accelerate
the reduction of carbon emissions in the U.S.; (2) to help state and
local governments prepare for the impacts of climate change; and (3)

40.

U.S. EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60
(released Aug. 3, 2015, not yet published in the Federal Register),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cppfinal-rule.pdf [http://perma.cc/KVC7-BEFK].

41.

Id. at 9.

42.

Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric
Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014;
Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64965 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60,
62, 78) available at https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-22848
[https://perma.cc/WJQ9-2MQ9].

43.

Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA, available at
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-powerplan [http://perma.cc/C6WX-HBJ4]; see also Clean Power Plan:
Taking Action on Climate Change, EPA, available at
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan [http://perma.cc/L2SV-ACMC]
(giving more details about the rule and the legal issues that it raises);
see also Megan Herzog, Resource on the Clean Power Plan and EPA’s
Other Rulemakings under Clean Air Act §111, LEGAL PLANET, available
at http://legal-planet.org/2015/09/11/resources-on-the-clean-powerplan/ [http://perma.cc/6JM9-HNEA].

44.

See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17
(explaining the new rules that are being put in place and the effects that
they will have).
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to lead international efforts in globally reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and prepare for climate impacts.45
The first and third goals have proven integrally connected by the
Administration’s regulatory agenda under the CAA. Assessing that
connection affords an opportunity to consider how this agenda
intersects (1) with the UNFCCC’s existing framework, (2) with the
new international agreement penned at COP21, and (3) with other
factors that complicate the formulation of a climate change legacy for
the Obama Administration.
From at least the 2011 Conference in Durban, South Africa, to
the 20th Conference of the Parties in Lima, Peru, in 2014, Parties to
the UNFCCC have turned their attention to models for international
cooperation that avoid the stark categories employed in the Kyoto
Protocol.46 In Lima, the Parties confirmed the intention to adopt a
new protocol at COP21 in Paris: “another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to
all Parties.”47 The Conference further signaled the move away from
categorical national roles under a future agreement by underscoring
“its commitment to reaching an ambitious agreement in 2015 that
reflects that principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, in light of different national
circumstances.”48 In anticipation of meeting this goal at COP21,
Parties submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
45.

Id.

46.

See generally Daniel Bodansky, “The Durban Platform Negotiations:
Goals and Options” 2-3 (2012)
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bodansky_durban2_vp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XR48-DBUL] (analyzing the elements of the Durban
Platform and the possible role that a new instrument might play)
Bodansky highlights the “dramatic departure” in Durban “from the
Kyoto Protocol negotiating mandate, which had categorically excluded
any new commitments for developing countries,” and notes that the
negotiated Durban Platform made “no reference to the principle of
equity or the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities (CBDRRC),” nor repeated “the Convention’s
language that developed countries should ‘take the lead’ in combating
climate change.” Id. at 2-3.

47.

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 114, 2014, Lima Call for Climate Action, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Lima Call for
Climate Action]. This reiterated an intention already articulated in the
Durban Platform, which had called for development of “a protocol,
another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under
the Convention applicable to all parties.” United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Establishment of
an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012).

48.

Lima Call for Climate Action, supra note 47, at ¶ 3.
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(INDC) toward achieving the Convention’s core objective:
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.”49 The Conference in Paris concluded with an
agreement among all Parties to hold “the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2 [degrees Celsius] above preindustrial levels” or lower. To achieve this, Parties agreed “to
undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” through domestic
policy, agreeing that “efforts of all Parties will represent a progression
over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country
Parties for effective implementation” of the Agreement.50
Increased emphasis on national autonomy leading up to the
Conference, combined with inclusiveness across all Parties’
capabilities, represented a shift buoyed by momentum for an universal
agreement. The regulatory agenda under the CAA in the U.S. helped
build that momentum by demonstrating national effort and
commitment. Early in 2015, the Administration reported to the
Convention Secretariat that, “the United States intends to achieve an
economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 2628% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its
emissions by 28%.”51 CAA rules, including the Clean Power Plan,
comprise six out of the eight regulatory measures identified in the
U.S.’s INDC submission as completed or underway.52
Although it is too soon to chart the contours of the President’s
climate legacy, some impacts of the CAA agenda are already
cognizable and worth noting at this early stage. Foremost among
these is the solidification of GHG regulation under the CAA. Whether
the Clean Power Plan sustains legal challenge will not change that
49.

UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 2.

50.

Adoption of the Paris Agreement arts. 2 & 3, Draft decision-Annex:
Paris Agreement /CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BHH5-6WNM].

51.

US Cover Note INDC and Supporting Documents, INDC,
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/U
nited%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%
20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES52ATBZ].

52.

Reported CAA regulatory actions include fuel economy standards for
light-duty vehicles for model years 2012-2025 and for heavy-duty
vehicles for model years 2014-2018, with post-2018 in progress; approved
alternatives for and reductions in the use of high-GWP HFCs; carbon
pollution standards for new and existing power plants; standards for
methane emissions from landfills and the oil and gas sector. Non-CAA
measures reported include energy conservation standards for buildings,
appliances, and equipment under the Energy Policy Act and the Energy
Independence and Security Act. Id.
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fundamental point. To be sure, the outcome of pending litigation will
bear on the President’s climate change legacy – a rejection of the rule
by the courts would likely compromise the U.S. ability to meet its
international commitments on the pledged timeline. For this and
many other reasons, the legal proceedings are being closely watched
by opponents and proponents alike.53 After the D.C. Circuit denied
requests to stay the rule and fast-tracked the case for oral argument
in June 2016, the Supreme Court surprised observers by granted the
stay pending disposition of the petitions for review.54
The Administration’s CAA work is significant in several other key
respects, however, separate and apart from how the Clean Power Plan
litigation resolves. First, the CAA rulemaking eroded the perception
that congressional gridlock was an impervious barrier to climate
progress. There are indications now across the economy that a lowcarbon turn is increasingly being seen as inevitable.55 In the months
leading up to COP21, major companies across a range of industries
made public statements in support of a binding climate agreement in
Paris.56 These rules are undoubtedly a shift that can be a powerful
force behind the technological innovation some have argued for as a
primary response to climate change.57
53.

See West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Keith
Goldman, Energy Cases to Watch in 2016, LAW360 (Dec. 24, 2015),
https://www.crowell.com/files/20151224-Energy-Cases-To-Watch-In2016-Eisenstat.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MK9-NAMC] (listing the Clean
Power Plan litigation first among “six cases that energy attorneys are
going to be watching closely in 2016).

54.

Order (Document #1594951), West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016); Order in Pending Case (Document #15A773),
West Virginia et al. v. EPA, 577 U.S. __ (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016).

55.

We Mean Business Coalition, Investors Call Upon Governments to
Secure a Clear, Long-Term Goal at COP21, WE MEAN BUSINESS (Oct.
11, 2015), available at
http://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/blog/investors-call-upongovernments-secure-clear-long-term-goal-cop21 [http://perma.cc/MJN6JM2M].

56.

See Oil and gas CEOs jointly declare action on climate change, OIL &
GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/oil-and-gas-ceosjointly-declare-action-on-climate-change/ [http://perma.cc/5H8R-T895]
(explaining that ten of the world’s largest oil and gas companies have
declared their support for an effective climate change agreement.); A
Call for Climate Action in Paris, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, available at http://www.c2es.org/international/parisstatement [http://perma.cc/Q376-8UKJ]; We Mean Business Coalition,
supra note 55.

57.

See Jonathan Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of
Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 450-51 (2011) (arguing against the use of the
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Second, proceeding with rulemaking for greenhouse gases under
the CAA avoided a gap that might have been created post-Mass. v.
EPA in the absence of agency action. The 2011 Supreme Court case
American Electric Power v. Connecticut made clear that the effect of
Mass. v. EPA was to preempt federal common law litigation relating
to greenhouse gas emissions.58 In American Electric Power, a case
initiated before the ruling in Mass. v. EPA, a coalition of eight states,
New York City, and three land trusts sued the nation’s biggest
utilities under public nuisance theories, seeking to enjoin emissions
reductions. There, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that
although the EPA had not yet exercised its authority to regulate
greenhouse gases, recognition of that authority by the Court in Mass.
v. EPA was sufficient to preempt the claims.59 Without the
Administration’s subsequent rulemaking, the impact of American
Electric Power’s preemption ruling would have been a more
consequential limitation on common law in the climate context.
Third, the Administration’s CAA agenda carried significance in
the Framework Convention context and for the U.S. posture
approaching COP21. This is reflected in the preamble to the Clean
Power Plan final rule, released within months of the Conference,
which explains that the “rule establishes…the foundation for longer
term GHG emission reduction strategies necessary to address climate
change and, in so doing, confirms the international leadership of the
U.S. in the global effort to address climate change.”60 Taken together,
the CAA rules are central to the President’s effort to reassert an
effective and credible leadership role for the U.S. in international
climate negotiations. Further, this work provided a basis for the
President to pursue bilateral climate agreements with China, India,
and Brazil, widely viewed as important to shifting the dynamic that
prevented U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol.
The statement in the Clean Power Plan preamble also reflects
recognition that climate change will require further decarbonization
than this rule alone can achieve. Policy critiques of this centerpiece
regulation range, predictably, from assertions that the rule is too
aggressive, to worries the rule does not do enough. Among those
arguing the Clean Power Plan is too aggressive are coal companies
and states who filed lawsuits challenging the rule even before it was
final, hoping for (but failing to obtain) preliminary injunctions on the
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases and favoring approaches
that focus on fostering on technological innovation).
58.

Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).

59.

Id.

60.

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Red. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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rulemaking.61 Among those scrutinizing the efficacy of the Clean
Power Plan as a climate change mitigation measure are climate policy
advocates tracking the prospects for climate stabilization.62 The World
Resources Institute, for instance, projects that “to get on track… [for
the] 2025 target of 26–28 percent below 2005 levels, the United States
will need to go beyond actions taken to date.”63 Although the
Administration still projects confidence in these numbers, some
estimates show these approaches falling short of the INDC, in the
range of 16-23 percent.64 Sources evaluating the ambitions of INDCs
have rated the U.S. as “medium,” suggesting it should be higher.65
There may be additional possibilities for further GHG reductions
using existing legal authority. Recent legal analyses, for example,
suggest there is alternative authority under CAA § 115 for a
nationwide carbon emissions reduction plan like the Clean Power
Plan, developed under § 111, but this has not yet been pursued.66
Likewise, a promising source of additional reductions would be
methane standards for existing oil and gas wells, but to date there is
no certain indication that the EPA will develop these rules.
The force of the Administration’s CAA agenda will be an
important aspect of Obama’s climate legacy, but it will not be the
only factor shaping perspectives on the President’s commitment to
the UNFCCC’s core aspiration. Seemingly mixed messages from the
Administration have been hard for observers to reconcile with the
commitment that seems to underlie the CAA rules. Three
controversial issues in particular have troubled advocates of strong
climate policy during the Obama Presidency, and only in recent
months have they begun to resolve.
The highest profile and most contentious among these has been
the Keystone XL pipeline. This infrastructure project was
61.

In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

62.

USA, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (Sept. 4, 2015), available at
http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa.html
[http://perma.cc/3UM9-Q94Z].

63.

Karl Hausker et al., Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10Point Plan Toward a Low-Carbon Future 2 (World Res. Institute,
Working Paper, 2015).

64.

Id. at 4.

65.

See Tracking INDCs, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, available at
http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html [http://perma.cc/ZBV5DNNT] (providing an assessment of mitigation contributions to the
Paris Agreement.).

66.

See Michael Burger, et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under § 115 of the Clean Air Act (Jan. 2016),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatechange/legal_pathways_to_reducing_ghg_emissions_under_section_1
15_of_the_caa.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG9V-4H9J].
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controversial because it is designed to transport oil from Canadian tar
sands, known to be highly carbon-intensive, to the Texas coast for
export.67 Some climate activists regarded it as a sort of litmus test on
the President’s commitment to climate mitigation.68 Initially, the
State Department reported the environmental impact of the Keystone
pipeline would not be significant, and the Administration’s seeming
openness to project approval prompted grassroots organizations to
rally tens of thousands to the Capitol in protest.69 President Obama
vetoed a bill that would have approved the Keystone XL pipeline, but
the project was still officially under State Department review.70
Ultimately, toward the end of 2015, the President ended the multiyear controversy by rejecting the permit application.71 The Record of
Decision (ROD) shows the Administration considered the pipeline to
have international symbolic importance, noting “it is strategically
important for the U.S. to continue to play a leadership role in the
worldwide fight against climate change.”72 The ROD acknowledged
that “many will see it as a test of U.S. willingness to take significant
and difficult decisions as part of a broader effort to address climate
change.”73
A second example of what has been widely seen as mixed
messaging from the President is his stance on Arctic oil and gas
exploration. The Administration’s approvals of exploratory oil drilling
67.

See generally New Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov
[http://perma.cc/3QVM-59TP] (providing information about the
Keystone XL Pipeline).

68.

Scott Horsley, Keystone Greens See Pipeline Test For Obama, NPR
(Feb. 20, 2014, 4:00 PM), available at
http://www.npr.org/2014/02/20/280255167/keystone-greens-seepipeline-as-crucial-test-for-obama [http://perma.cc/Q37P-AGEN].

69.

Kristine Delkus & James White, Application of Transcanada Keystone
Pipeline, L.P. for a Presidential Permit Authorizing the Construction,
Connection, Operation, and Maintenance of Pipeline Facilities for the
Importation of Crude Oil to be Located at the United States-Canada
Border, U.S. DEP’T STATE 2 (May 4, 2012), http://keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/documents/organization/189504.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F8KP-Z84P].

70.

Juliet Eilperin & Katie Zezima, Obama vetoes Keystone XL bill, WASH.
POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/02/24/keystone-xl-bill-a-k-a-veto-bait-heads-topresidents-desk/ [https://perma.cc/8UBG-Z5J7].

71.

Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: TransCanada
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit, U.S. DEP’T
STATE (Nov. 3, 2015), available at https://keystonepipelinexl.state.gov/nid/249254.htm [https://perma.cc/5GWE-G6EG].
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permits in the Chukchi Seas were confusing at best, and
environmental groups have been in litigation against the Department
of the Interior for years.74 At a time when the President seemed keen
to reduce GHG emissions via the CAA why would the Administration
encourage new exploitation of fossil fuels better left in place?75
A third point of inconsistency has been the Administration’s
failure to revisit decades-old policies for coal leasing on federal public
lands–the source of roughly forty percent of the nation’s coal
production. Coal leasing on federal lands has seemed at clear crosspurposes with the goals of CAA regulations curbing emissions from
coal-fired power plants. In the final year of the second term, this
conflict is receiving the Administration’s attention–in January 2016,
the Department of the Interior announced a moratorium on new coal
leasing and the launch of a comprehensive review of the federal coal
program.76
Alongside these controversies, there have been clear areas of
achievement apart from the CAA rulemaking that demonstrate the
President’s commitments to domestic climate action, such as support
for renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Climate Action Plan
states a goal of doubling renewable energy and increasing energy
efficiency by twenty percent in commercial and industrial buildings by
2020.77 The Bureau of Land management in the Department of the
Interior, for example, has developed Solar Energy Zones on public
land that will be able to support infrastructure to power over seven

74.

See generally Earthjustice, Focus Area: The Arctic, available at
http://earthjustice.org/the-wild/arctic [https://perma.cc/W94N-64SD]
(detailing federal litigation and related advocacy).

75.

See Coral Davenport, Alaska’s Tricky Intersection of Obama’s Energy
and Climate Legacies, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/politics/alaskas-trickyintersection-of-obamas-energy-and-climate-legacies.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/S9F8-FEAM] (discussing the “uneasy balance
between Mr. Obama’s leadership on climate change and his efforts to
ensure that the United States benefits from newfound oil and gas
wealth.”).

76.

See Sec’y Interior, Order No. 3338, Discretionary Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the Federal Coal
Program (Jan. 15, 2016), available at
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Director
ate/public_affairs/news_release_attachments.Par.4909.File.dat/SO%20
3338%20Coal.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5G-L8CT]; see also Fact Sheet:
Modernizing the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 16, 2016),
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Director
ate/public_affairs/news_release_attachments.Par.47489.File.dat/Coal%
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million homes.78 Time will tell how the Administration’s decisions
across varied contexts will be judged together as a climate legacy.

III. Conclusion
The President’s domestic climate action uses existing law and
does, at minimum, two things relative to the international law
context. First, it fulfills the longstanding obligation for “national
policies” under the Convention, and second, it makes U.S. efforts to
lead on the international stage more credible. A third function,
particularly applicable to the CAA regulatory agenda, may be to
provide a basis for the President to enter in a new binding climate
agreement. According to international law Professor David Wirth,
laws “already in place domestically,” including those “undertaken by
the executive branch unilaterally,” provide “sufficiently firm legal
footing that the President can confidently make parallel legally
binding international commitments that track those domestic
undertakings.”79 Likewise, Professor Daniel Bodansky concludes that,
“depending on its contents, the president might be able to join the
Paris agreement on the basis of existing constitutional, statutory,
and/or treaty authority, without submitting it to the Senate or
Congress for approval.”80 In these ways, the Obama Administration’s
Clean Air Act rulemaking is central to the climate change legacy that
will emerge in time, as well as to the present and future U.S.
negotiating posture and ability to meet international obligations for
climate change mitigation.
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